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Executive Summary
With over 3000 people killed, more than 200 villages 
burnt, over 750,000 people internally displaced and 
1.3 million people in need of assistance, there is an 
urgent need to resolve the Cameroon Anglophone 
conflict. This is a highly neglected conflict between 
the Cameroonian military forces and armed separatist 
groups which has been ongoing since October 2017. The 
armed separatist groups are fighting for an independent 
state called ‘Ambazonia’, comprising the country’s two 
English-speaking Northwest and Southwest regions. This 
report captures the voices and experiences of local civil 
society organisations (CSOs) – an important but largely 
marginalised voice – in their efforts towards conflict 
resolution in a challenging environment. Findings stem 
from an empirical pilot study conducted by Coventry 
University’s Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations 
(CTPSR) and partners from the African Leadership 
Centre, Nairobi, and the University of Buea (UB), 
Cameroon. The pilot study brought together 15 CSOs 
from the two English-speaking regions in a one-day 
workshop to learn about their organisations’ experiences 
in conflict resolution, the challenges they faced, and the 
strategies adopted to overcome such challenges. The 
workshop discussions were then followed up with six in-
depth interviews with selected CSO leaders. The voices 
and experiences of the diverse CSOs are examined 
within the framework of two contrasting discourses: the 
important role of CSOs in conflict resolution and the 
phenomenon of ‘shrinking civic space’ for CSO action. 
The study notes that while the operational structures 
of CSOs are increasingly constrained by government 
restrictions and by security threats stemming from the 
civil war situation, local CSOs from the affected English-
speaking regions of Cameroon have, nonetheless, made 
significant efforts to resolve the conflict. These issues are 
elaborated in this report, which is laid out in seven sections.
The introduction briefly examines the current conflict and 
efforts towards conflict resolution before justifying the 
need to examine the role of local CSOs within the context 
of increasing restriction of civic space in Cameroon. It 
concludes by briefly elaborating on the research methods. 
Thereafter Section Two locates the research within two 
strands of relevant scholarly literature: the local turn in 
the conflict resolution literature towards ‘peacebuilding 
from below’; and that of ‘shrinking civic space’ for 
civil society activities. The third section provides the 
historical background to the longstanding ‘Anglophone 
problem’ in Cameroon that morphed into a civil war in 
2017 and which has pitted Cameroonian government 
forces against separatist armed groups in the English-
speaking regions. It notes that the current conflict has its 
roots in the legacies that stem from Cameroon’s unique 
colonial history and the nature of post-independence 
settlements. The subsequent empirical sections focus 
on the three main objectives of this pilot study: Section 
Four on the contributions of CSOs in conflict resolution; 
Section Five on the challenges they face; and Section Six 
on the strategies that CSOs adopt to counter the civic 
restrictions and to contribute to conflict resolution efforts. 
Section Seven concludes by summarising the findings, 
noting the following:
•	 	CSOs	within	the	English-speaking	regions	of	
Cameroon are in a difficult and paradoxical situation 
that pits their important role in peacebuilding from 
below within the context of shrinking civic space for 
their actions. Such restrictions are due to a tightening 
of government legislation and military crackdown on 
protests and gatherings that have not received written 
authorisation. 
•	 	CSOs	have	reoriented	their	activities	towards	
resolution of the conflict by engaging with most-
affected communities to provide humanitarian relief 
and psychosocial support, by building an evidence 
base of human rights violations and war crimes by 
both parties, and by highlighting the conflict’s adverse 
consequences for citizens.
•	 	CSOs	have	worked	to	rally	community	support,	built	
coalitions with other CSOs and networked with 
international NGOs in advocacy work towards peaceful 
resolution of the conflict. Such strategies have enabled 
CSOs to counter shrinking civic space and remain 
visible as conflict resolution actors.
•	 	Working	through	coalitions	and	interacting	with	both	
government and non-state armed actors has given 
CSOs more power to maintain pressure for conflict 
resolution.
•	 	Dialogue	with	local	communities	has	also	enabled	
CSOs to act as mediators in bottom-up processes, 
enhancing local agency and bringing the views of those 
affected into policy spaces.
6 INTRODUCTION
This report presents the findings of a pilot study into 
the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in efforts 
being made to resolve the current ‘Anglophone’ conflict 
in bilingual Cameroon. The warring parties are the 
dominant Francophone state and armed separatist groups 
calling for an independent state of ‘Ambazonia’ in the 
two English-speaking regions, Northwest and Southwest 
Cameroon. This is a neglected and underreported war 
(Norwegian Refugee Council 2019). The current crisis 
commenced in October 2016 with peaceful protests 
led by ‘lawyers in wigs and teachers in suits’ to protect 
the English legal and educational systems against 
Francophone assimilation. It subsequently degenerated 
into a civil war in 2017 as armed separatist groups 
emerged following government repression of the mass 
protests. The consequences have been severe, especially 
for civilian populations in rural areas, with almost daily 
violence and atrocities in the Southwest and Northwest 
regions since October 2017. Numbers killed vary from 
official figures of 3,000 to reports of 12,000 people 
(France24 2019; Kamguia 2020), with at least 750,000 
displaced, and hundreds of villages destroyed (UNICEF 
2018). Moreover, 700,000 children are out of school, 
with 80% of schools closed (UNOCHA 2019), due to a 
schools boycott, enforced by the separatists, protesting 
educational injustices against English-speakers. A June 
2019 report documents killings, rape, kidnappings, torture 
and unlawful imprisonment (CHRDA and RWCHR 2019). 
The frequent subjection of women and girls to rape 
and other forms of gender-based violence is especially 
shocking and disturbing, with the same report stating 
that ‘more than 75 percent of women interviewed had 
experienced physical or sexual violence’(CHRDA and 
RWCHR 2019: 33). While unlawful killings and severe 
human rights abuses have undoubtedly been committed 
by both sides (Willis et al. 2019: 21-28), documentary 
evidence indicates that the Cameroonian security forces 
are responsible for a majority of the killings and burning of 
homes, and for a greater level of indiscriminate violence 
(Willis et al. 2020: 35-36). 
There is an urgent need to end the violence and resolve 
the conflict, yet there is a current impasse in such efforts. 
The main official attempt at conflict resolution thus far 
has been the government-organised ‘Major National 
Dialogue’ from 30 September to 4 October 2019. This 
was unsuccessful in making any progress (Köpp, 2019; 
Hendricks and Ngah, 2019). It was criticised for only 
including a narrow set of elite actors and excluding 
key actors from the dialogue. Not only were the major 
separatist groups (Chimtom 2019) excluded, but also the 
participation of peaceful civil society groups and women’s 
organisations was highly restricted (Ahmed 2019). Some 
analysts even doubted the sincerity of the government 
(International Crisis Group, 2020; Willis et al., 2020: 85), 
with the military crackdown in the Anglophone regions 
intensifying immediately afterwards and the government 
seemingly determined to pursue a military solution. Calls 
for more ‘inclusive dialogue’ have come from the Vatican 
and the Swiss government, offering to mediate peace 
talks (International Crisis Group, 2019). However, such 
external calls remain top-down and elite-driven and 
have not been successful. Therefore, this study turns its 
attention to the role of local CSOs, predominantly non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), in conflict resolution 
efforts, of which little is known. In so doing the study 
builds on notions of a bottom-up or grassroots approach 
to conflict resolution: what is, at times, referred to as the 
‘local turn’ in peacebuilding. Yet, it is also evident that 
local CSOs are faced with an especially difficult context 
where their space for manoeuvre and action is limited by 
government constraints and by the conflict environment 
itself – often referred to in the scholarly literature as 
‘shrinking civic space’. Therefore, the main objective of the 
study is to examine the conflict resolution efforts made by 
CSOs, the constraints they face, and their responses to 
such constraints. Specifically, the study seeks to answer 
the following questions:
1.  To what extent and in what ways do local CSOs 
engage in conflict resolution efforts?
2.  What are the key challenges faced by CSOs in such 
efforts to resolve the Cameroon ‘Anglophone’ crisis?
3.  What practices do CSOs employ in attempts to 
overcome such constraints and how effective are they? 
The study was carried out by researchers from the 
Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR) 
at Coventry University, UK, the African Leadership 
Centre, Nairobi, Kenya, and from the University of Buea, 
Cameroon. To address these questions, primary data 
was collected in Cameroon between January and May 
2020. A full-day ‘consultative dialogue workshop’ was 
held in Douala, Cameroon, on 29 January 2020 with 
representatives from 15 Cameroonian CSOs, all involved 
in conflict-related activities centring on humanitarian 
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responses and conflict resolution. The CSOs could all be 
described as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
with professionally-qualified staff. They ranged from 
women’s organisations to youth-led associations, human 
rights groups, a teachers’ association, and humanitarian 
and development organisations. They included national 
organisations as well as regional and local ones. All were 
operational either in the Southwest and/or Northwest 
regions, the two ‘Anglophone’ regions, though some also 
had a base in the capital city Yaoundé. Two organisations 
were national branches of international organisations. 
The workshop encouraged CSOs to engage in mutually 
beneficial discussion and reflection and was composed 
of two main components. First, the morning programme 
involved three sessions, each facilitated by one 
participating NGO. These sessions explored the roles 
that CSOs have played in conflict resolution efforts, the 
challenges faced, and the capacity needs of CSOs in 
conflict resolution. In these three sessions, the facilitating 
NGO introduced the topic, gave illustrations from their 
own work and simultaneously raised issues for general 
discussion. The afternoon session involved participants 
being divided into two groups for ‘focus group 
discussions’ (FGDs), with a common list of questions 
posed by the workshop organisers. A final session 
entailed reporting back on the conversations in each FGD, 
with the opportunity for further summative discussion. 
Subsequently, follow-up semi-structured interviews were 
held in May 2020 with senior representatives from six 
key CSOs. The interviews were carried out in Buea, the 
capital of the Southwest region. For all interviews, a guide 
containing nine key questions was used in the same way. 
Each interview took up to 50 minutes and was carried out 
at the interviewee’s preferred location, making it possible 
for the issues to be discussed in-depth. The interviews 
complemented the FGDs as interviewees provided more 
detailed explanations of some of the issues discussed 
during the January 2020 workshop.
This report is divided into seven sections. After this brief 
introduction, the second section locates the research 
within two strands of relevant scholarly literature: the 
‘local turn’ in the conflict resolution literature towards 
‘peacebuilding from below’, and the ‘shrinking civic space’ 
for civil society activities. The third section provides 
background information on the current ‘Anglophone 
conflict’ that has pitted Cameroonian government forces 
against separatist armed groups in the English-speaking 
regions, yet has its roots in the legacies that stem from 
Cameroon’s unique colonial history and the nature 
of post-independence settlements. The subsequent 
three sections provide the substance of this research, 
based on the primary data. The fourth section outlines 
the contribution of CSOs to conflict resolution, while 
the fifth indicates the challenges faced in the context 
of shrinking civic space, and the sixth highlights the 
strategies adopted to counter these challenges. Finally, 
the conclusion summarises the overall findings. 
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This section situates our research within two somewhat 
contradictory strands of recent scholarly literature: the 
‘local turn’ in conflict resolution, also referred to as 
‘peacebuilding from below’, and that of ‘shrinking civic 
space’. While the former focuses on the increasing 
significance of CSOs in conflict resolution, the latter 
highlights the limits to CSOs’ activities in contexts 
where the state endeavours to shrink available civic 
space. Within four sub-sections, the first two introduce 
the key concepts of ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘civil 
society’ used in this research, followed by brief reviews 
of the literature in the areas of ‘peacebuilding from 
below’ and ‘shrinking civic space’ in the third and fourth 
sub-sections respectively. 
2.1 Armed conflict and conflict resolution
Armed conflict can be of international or national character 
(Stewart, 2003). It has received much scholarly attention, 
but there is no single definition for it in politics and 
international humanitarian law literature. However, several 
scholars and practitioners have adopted the definition 
of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) which 
states that armed conflict is ‘a contested incompatibility 
that concerns government and/or territory where the use 
of armed force between two parties, of which at least 
one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 
battle-related deaths in one calendar year’ (Themnér and 
Wallensteen 2013: 1; Wallensteen 2019: 371). 
Conflicts arise from human rights violations (Thoms and 
Ron 2007), poor communication (Krauss & Morsella 
2006: 146-147), or a clash of ideas and interests 
(Bornstein 2003; Schellenberg 1996: 8). While armed 
conflict is undesirable, it is viewed as part of normal 
human relationships (Katz & McNulty, 1994) and as 
part of political behaviour (Clausewitz, 1832). Neo-
Marxist structuralists opine that the State’s key role is 
the prevention of social conflict (Barrow 1993: 8). Yet, 
where this fails and conflict escalates, conflict resolution 
becomes necessary, particularly when none of the parties 
can win the war and/or the armed confrontation is having 
serious consequences for the rest of society. 
Conflict resolution has been viewed variably in the peace 
and security literature. Wani (2011), for example, defines 
it as:
an umbrella term for a whole range of methods 
and approaches for dealing with conflict: from 
negotiation to diplomacy, from mediation to 
arbitration, from facilitation to adjudication, from 
conciliation to conflict prevention, from conflict 
management to conflict transformation, from 
restorative justice to peacekeeping (2011: 105). 
However, peacebuilding has become the preferred 
approach to conflict resolution. Therefore, unlike 
Wallensteen (2002: 8), who offers a definition that 
suggests that conflict resolution brings together [only] 
belligerents, scholars such as Barnes (2006) and Assal 
(2016) have argued that local actors, notably from the 
sphere of ‘civil society’, must be included in the conflict 
resolution process if it is going to yield the desired results. 
2.2 Civil society 
CIVICUS, the global alliance of civil society organisations, 
defines civil society as ‘the arena, outside of the family, the 
state and the market, which is created by individual and 
collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance 
shared interests’ (2011: 8). There is an increasing wealth of 
scholarship on the role of civil society in conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding. Scholars argue that one very crucial 
reason for civil society participation in conflict resolution is 
to imbue legitimacy in the process. Zanker (2013: 3), who 
looks at civil society involvement in mediation processes 
in Liberia and Kenya, contends that ‘[s]ince the entire 
population cannot attend peace negotiations, civil society 
groups become the people’s representatives and their 
involvement improves the prospect of ownership of both 
the negotiations and the outcome.’ Fischer (2011) also 
holds this view, but to Puljek-Shank & Verkoren (2017: 1), 
‘local legitimacy is not based on ethnicness per se, but 
CSOs’ ability to skilfully interact with ethnically divided 
constituencies and political structures’. 
Other analysts view the role of civil society in conflict 
resolution as one of mediation (Bartoli 2009: 407; DPI 
2012; Greenderb, Berg and Lacatus 2011: 83; Mawlawi 
1993), while Hamidi (2018) argues that civil society is 
a key actor in grass-roots peacebuilding. The literature 
also assesses the challenges faced by civil society in 
conflict resolution. In effect, peace-making so often 
seeks to reconcile warring factions that the tendency is 
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Organisations and Shrinking Civic Space 
9CONFLICT RESOLUTION, CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS AND SHRINKING CIVIC SPACE
to recruit (members of the) civil society as mediator(s). 
Thus, the inclination is often to ignore the issues that 
led to fighting and instead focus on elite-pacts. As the 
purveyor of legitimacy, civil society can help to refocus 
the process by pushing for more inclusive participation 
and ensuring that conflict resolution stays relevant to 
the context. Also, belligerents often claim to represent 
national interests, but are often so much more interested 
in their own agendas that focusing only on their demands 
may lead to a situation where a new social order, one 
that more faithfully meets the aspirations of the people, is 
missed. Koko (2016:130), for example, demonstrated that 
the Congolese civil society understood that the second 
Congo war of 1998-2003, also known as the ‘Great War 
of Africa’, was ‘merely symptoms of a quest for the new 
democratic order’. As such, civil society insisted that 
negotiations must:
seek to go beyond merely reconciling the warring 
parties to provide an opportunity for all national 
socio-political stakeholders to chart a new 
democratic path for the country. This perspective 
was to a large extent based on the experience 
accumulated during the National Sovereign 
Conference of the early 1990s (Koko 2016: 130). 
However, peace processes, such as in Congo, that seek 
to bring together warring factions (the state party and 
insurgent groups), are termed ‘official’. This is as opposed 
to ‘unofficial’ processes that are more grassroots. Das 
(2007) has determined that civil society can play a very 
important role in resolving conflict and building peace at 
the grassroots level. According to Das, civil society’s role 
here is to:
negotiate across ethnic boundaries and make 
it possible for rival communities to live together 
in the same village, locality, or neighbourhood. 
For civil society groups to be more effective in 
peacebuilding, they must be socially integrated 
and develop synergy with other constituents and 
stakeholders (2007:1).
Therefore, despite various challenges, civil society is 
viewed as a key player in conflict resolution. Fischer 
(2011: 307) states that ‘support for civil society should 
be further developed as a key element of development 
and peace politics, in particular in post-war regeneration 
and peacebuilding’. He justifies the inclusion of civil 
society in conflict resolution in that it allows for views 
from the broader society to be heard instead of focusing 
on the needs of armed groups and warlords. He notes in 
particular that it is the only way women’s voices can be 
heard in the process, and that it multiplies the ‘chance 
of reaching a broader political and social consensus that 
is necessary to make peace agreements sustainable’ 
(Fischer 2011: 307). However, some scholars do not find 
so much value in the role of civil society. For example, 
Bayart (1989) captures its existence as a fight to offset 
the domination of State, while Tester (1992) thinks its 
existence or non-existence is insignificant. Moreover, 
Subedi & Bhatta (2016: 25) think that ‘the role of civil 
society [in conflict resolution] has been limited to securing 
interest for their own personal and organisational well-
being and is largely captured and dominated by the elites’. 
Koko (2016) identified the same challenge in Congo 
where, in addition, there was a tendency for the political 
opposition and belligerents to view civil society actors as 
potential allies, leading to a politicisation of civil society.
2.3 Peacebuilding from below
Notwithstanding the above views on the potentially 
important role of civil society, conflict resolution in 
civil war situations has been predominantly a top-
down process, often led by international organisations, 
especially the UN and national governments. Such elite-
level approaches have mainly focused on the formulation 
and implementation of official peace agreements. 
However, top-down approaches have been subject to 
criticism. Pearson (2001), for example, emphasises that 
elite approaches to resolving ethno-political conflicts (as 
is the case in Cameroon) can be problematic because 
they undermine trust, and outcomes often do not reflect 
the needs of those most-affected local populations. 
Labonte (2012: 91) concurs, noting that elite approaches 
enable those in authority to ‘control, shape and manipulate 
decision-making processes or institutions’ for their 
personal interests at the cost of the populace. Mac Ginty 
and Firchow (2016) add to this analysis by noting that 
top-down or elite interventions, often propagated through 
the liberal peace paradigm and led by outsiders, impose 
a particular understanding (‘hegemonic narratives’) of 
conflicts and their resolution which seldom consider 
the perspectives of affected communities. In the face 
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of such criticism, a bottom-up or grassroots approach, 
often associated with John Paul Lederach (1997), 
has increasingly taken centre stage in peacebuilding 
discourses (Mac Ginty 2010, Mac Ginty and Richmond 
2013). It places emphasis on the ‘significance of local 
actors and of the non-governmental sector and the links 
with local knowledge and wisdom’ (Ramsbotham et al. 
2016: 274). Some analysts consider such ‘peacebuilding 
from below’ as essential to resolving conflicts (Liaga 
2017; Netabay 2007), most notably in Africa, given 
that such approaches create space for the needs, 
perspectives and practices of local communities to 
be included in conflict resolution processes (Pearson 
2001). Further, as acknowledged by Urlacher (2008), 
bottom-up approaches recognise the resilience and 
efforts of local communities in navigating and mitigating 
daily challenges in the midst of conflict. Especially 
important within this perspective is the centrality of 
gender and recognition of the unique and crucial 
contribution of women to peacebuilding (Gizelis and 
Olsson 2015; Mazurana et al. 2013). 
However, as Ramsbotham et al. (2016) note, 
peacebuilding from below is not a panacea nor without 
its complexities. Local communities are also ‘sites of 
power asymmetry, patriarchy and privilege’ (2016: 
276), especially during population displacement, when 
traditional communal relations may have been replaced 
by ‘new militaristic tendencies’ (2016: 285). Civil society 
can itself be clientelist in nature (Goodhand and Klem 
2005: 24, cited in 2016: 276), and local groups may 
not be benign actors but themselves subject to ‘national 
and regional power plays’ (2016: 285). Additionally, 
a bottom-up approach to conflict resolution is unlikely 
to be sufficient in itself. It brings the perspectives, 
needs and interests of conflict-affected communities 
to peace negotiations, but resolution of conflict is likely 
to be formalised in national-level agreements and in 
governmental structures and legal frameworks. Therefore, 
an interplay between local and national levels is required, 
perhaps mediated by legalised and professionally-staffed 
CSOs. However, the role that they can play is also 
influenced by the wider national context and the extent to 
which they are affected by ‘shrinking civic space’. 
2.4 Shrinking civic space
The concepts of ‘civic space’ and ‘shrinking civic space’ 
can also be subject to varying interpretations. According 
to Bossuyt and Ronceray (2020: 3), ‘civic space refers 
to the public arena in which citizens can freely intervene 
and organize themselves with a view to defending their 
interests, values and identities; to claim their rights; to 
influence public policy making or call power holders to 
account’. Shrinking space (also closing space) in the light 
of the above can therefore be viewed as a situation where 
these freedoms and rights are increasingly under attack 
or facing various restrictions using legal and repressive 
(extra-legal) measures (Bossuyt and Ronceray 2020). 
Studies on shrinking civic space have examined how 
governments around the world have enacted legislation 
and adopted informal measures limiting the scope and 
activity of civil society (Hossain et al. 2018: 10). Strategies 
employed have included administrative and political means, 
as well as violence and the domination of public space to 
stigmatise civil society for diverse reasons (Carothers and 
Brechenmacher 2014). These efforts at reducing civic 
space have affected the work of CSOs working in different 
fields, including development, democracy promotion, 
protection and promotion of human rights, and conflict 
resolution. Thus, unsurprisingly, scholarly attention has 
focused on examining the challenges and prospects for 
more active CSO participation in the advancement of 
human processes in these areas. Our focus here is on the 
literature that deals with the importance of civil society, the 
causes of closing civic space, the conflict resolution role 
of CSOs in contexts of shrinking civic space and how civic 
space can be expanded and improved. 
The importance of improving civic space is recognised 
in the Resolution on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development (UN 2015). Article 36, relating to the 
Means of Implementation, notes that a global partnership 
necessitates the inclusion of civil society among other 
actors. The dependability of all these actors means that civil 
society has a not insignificant role to play in the attainment 
of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 which is to 
‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable 
development …’ (UN 2015: 25). According to Nyirabikali 
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(2016: 7), civil society ‘can ensure that there is a thorough 
understanding of the real issues behind a conflict and 
facilitate inclusive participation in the elaboration of 
appropriate solutions and their implementation’. Despite 
the recognition of its role, including in peace processes, 
civil society continues to face challenges in carrying out 
its activities, notably in conflict situations.
Following the end of the Cold War in 1990, civic space 
experienced an unprecedented bulge, which saw 
CSOs able to act without fear of encountering official 
disapproval or state violence and without fear of acting 
outside the law (Hossain et al 2018: 13). This expansion, 
however, has been followed by the opposite phenomenon 
of ‘shrinking civic space’, especially in the last decade, 
whereby governments globally have sought to restrict the 
scope of civil society activity, notably through restrictions 
on freedoms of expression, assembly and association 
(CIVICUS 2019). It is a phenomenon that has received 
significant attention from civil society actors themselves, 
notably from international civil society alliances such as 
CIVICUS and from international NGOs and thinktanks, 
as well as scholarly attention (Buyse 2018; Hossain et al. 
2018; Poppe and Wolff 2017). While the opening of civic 
space in the 1990s was associated with democratisation 
processes, its subsequent closure is correspondingly 
interlinked with the global resurgence of authoritarianism 
and the consolidation of hybrid regimes in the past 
decade (Buyse 2018: 976). In this respect, the drivers of 
shrinking space are largely a function of ‘wider political 
struggles between political, civic and economic actors’ 
(Hossain et al. 2018: 15), most notably in contexts of 
autocratic governance. 
Measures taken to shrink space have been both legal 
and repressive (extra-legal). Legal and administrative 
restrictions include laws and regulations on registration 
and on foreign funding (Hossain et al. 2018: 15; 
Transnational Institute 2017: 5). Extra-legal measures 
include violence and intimidation at the hands of both 
state and non-state actors, with the latter often acting 
with impunity and official protection (Hossain et al. 
2018: 14; Buyse 2018: 973). Other repressive measures 
include surveillance and censorship by the state – for 
example, by internet cuts, banning demonstrations and 
restricting mobilisation, and practices of discrediting and 
delegitimising selected CSOs by public and private actors 
(Transnational Institute 2017: 5). 
The annual CIVICUS State of Civil Society Report has 
been published since 2012. For a number of years, and 
even up to the most recent report (CIVICUS 2020: 12), 
it has consistently identified an overall global trend of 
growing civic space restrictions. Additionally, the CIVICUS 
Monitor provides empirical evidence and a (close to) real-
time update and rating of 196 countries according to a 
five-level categorisation – closed, repressed, obstructed, 
narrowed and open space.1 The most recent report based 
on CIVICUS Monitor data (CIVICUS 2019) indicates a 
continuing civic space crisis, with more countries having 
worsened their ratings than having improved them.2 
Cameroon continues to be rated as ‘repressed’, the worst 
but one rating, indicating that ‘civic space is significantly 
constrained’. While the overall trend is clear, it is evident 
that the local political context must be examined at the 
country-specific level in order to identify the particular 
causes of shrinking civic space, the specific challenges 
faced by CSOs, and the characteristics, functions and 
strategies employed by the CSOs (Van der Borgh and 
Terwindt 2012:1068, cited in Hossain et al. 2018: 15). 
Conflict-affected countries, especially civil war scenarios, 
entail particular dynamics, notably in relation to questions 
of perceived security and securitisation. 
Some attention has been afforded to the consequences 
for CSOs’ contribution to conflict resolution in countries 
where civic space is under attack. There has also been 
some consideration to the consequences for CSOs and 
their role in conflict resolution in countries where civic 
space is under attack. For example, in Mali, Lode (1997) 
argues that by investing heavily in curtailing the power 
of the traditional leadership, France, the former colonial 
power, contributed to the closing of civic space. As a 
result, local CSO leaders – out of fear of repression 
– avoided taking initiatives for conflict resolution and 
instead largely supported government views on issues of 
conflict and justice. Yet, despite the hostile environment 
for CSOs, Nyirabikali (2016: 5) argues that CSOs played 
an important role in the implementation of the 2015 Peace 
Agreement in Mali. 
1. https://monitor.civicus.org/about/
2. https://civicus.contentfiles.net/media/assets/file/GlobalReport2019.pdf
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This section provides the historical background to the 
current conflict and explores the role and situation of civil 
society actors in Cameroon. Divided into three sub-sections, 
the first outlines Cameroon’s colonial history, processes of 
decolonisation and post-independence developments at 
state level that underpin the current conflict. The second 
then examines the responses historically by Anglophone 
civil society actors, including scholars, to these questions 
of the state and national identity and their quest for greater 
autonomy. The third explores the vicissitudes of civic space 
in post-independence Cameroon, focusing on the notion 
of ‘shrinking civic space’ in the context of conflict.
3.1 Colonialism, decolonisation and the post-
colonial state in Cameroon 
Cameroon has a unique colonial history, the legacies 
of which underpin the current conflict. Cameroon first 
became a German colony in 1884, known as Kamerun, 
at the time when the major European powers carved  
up Africa between them at the Berlin Conference  
(1884-85). 
3. Background to the Conflict and  
Civil Society in Cameroon
Figure 2: Boundaries of the German colony of Kamerun (1901-1918) (Munji, 2020)
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However, German colonisation was short-lived. During 
the First World War, France and Britain invaded German 
Kamerun and defeated German forces in 1916. After 
the war, in June 1919, the country was partitioned 
between France and Britain under separate League of 
Nations mandates. This arrangement was later confirmed 
by the United Nations under the framework of a UN 
Trust Territory. French Cameroun amounted to 80% of 
the territory, while the British-administered 20% was 
referred to as British Cameroons, divided into British 
Northern and Southern Cameroons, and governed as 
part of Nigeria (Nfi 2014). 
In 1954, both parts of British Cameroons gained a 
quasi-regional status from Nigeria (Nkwi and Nyamnjoh 
1997: 88). Following the rise of nationalist movements, 
this quasi-regional status resulted in a UN-organised 
plebiscite on 11 February 1961 for Northern and 
Southern British Cameroons to decide how they were 
to gain independence. Crucially, the people were not 
given the choice of a separate independent state. 
The plebiscite question was either to join French 
Cameroun, which had already gained independence on 
1 January 1960 as the Republic of Cameroon (LRC), 
or to join Nigeria, which had gained its independence 
on 1 October 1960. The result was split, with British 
Southern Cameroons voting to join the Republic of 
Cameroon, while British Northern Cameroons voted 
to join Nigeria. Following the plebiscite, the Foumban 
Constitutional Conference in July 1961 discussed the 
unification process between the Republic of Cameroon 
and British Southern Cameroons. The resulting 
constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon 
(1961) opted for an indissoluble federal system (article 
47 of the Federal Constitution of 1961) and thus the 
creation of the Federal Republic of Cameroon made up 
of two federated states: West (former British Southern 
Cameroons) and East (former French Cameroun). The 
Federal Constitution came into effect on 1 October 
1961, effectively the date of Southern Cameroons’ 
‘independence’ from British colonial rule. It is worth 
noting, however, that the administering authority of 
the Southern Cameroons – the United Kingdom – did 
not attend the Foumban Constitutional Conference, 
whereas the UN Trusteeship Agreement stipulated 
that only the administering authority could negotiate 
international treaties on behalf of the Trust territory. 
Moreover, the union Constitution was not adopted in 
the House of Assembly of the Southern Cameroons and 
was not backed by a Treaty of Union to be submitted 
and registered at the United Nations Secretariat. 
Nonetheless, a federal system was important, given that 
the French and British colonial administrations had led to 
distinct styles of governance and public administration, 
including different legal and education systems, and, of 
course, different official languages.
Figure 3: Partition of German Kamerun into French 
and British mandates of French Cameroun and British 
Northern and Southern Cameroons (1919-1960)  
(Cok, 2019).
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However, almost in contradistinction to federalism, it is 
noteworthy that the Federal Constitution established 
a highly centralised system with substantial powers 
in the hands of the President and very little autonomy 
for the States, notably West Cameroon (Elong 2013). 
Indeed, then President Ahmadou Ahidjo’s intent to further 
centralise power in an authoritarian and unitary state soon 
became clear. In 1962, Ahidjo ended multipartyism in former 
French Cameroon with the creation of a single party, Union 
Cameroonians (UC). Initially, UC continued to collaborate 
at federal level with the dominant political party in West 
Cameroon – Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) 
– but in 1966 the two parties merged to form the Union 
National Cameroonaise (UNC), thus creating a one-party 
system in the federation (Bayart 1973). Then, in May 1972, 
a controversial referendum was held by President Ahidjo 
to approve a new constitution which abolished the federal 
system and created a unitary state. Following the dissolution 
of the federal system, the State of West Cameroon was 
divided into two provinces, the North West and South 
West Provinces, subsequently renamed as regions. 
This deepened the grievances of English speakers. As 
Fombad (2017: 38) stated:
The threats to the elimination of the Anglophone 
identity within the country were reinforced when on 
2 June 1972 a new Constitution was introduced, 
and without regard to article 47 of the 1961 
Federal Constitution which prohibited this, the 
federal system was abolished and replaced with 
a unitary system that was officially known as the 
‘United Republic of Cameroon’.
Subequently in 1984, President Paul Biya, with Presidential 
Decree 84/01, renamed the United Republic of Cameroon 
as La République du Cameroun, thereby reinstating the 
name adopted at independence on 1 January 1960, before 
reunification with the former British Southern Cameroons 
(Republic of Cameroon 1984). As Fombad (2017: 38) 
notes, ‘This was seen by many Anglophone Cameroonians 
as removing one of the last symbolic vestiges of the 
1961 reunification of the two distinct communities’.
Figure 4: Map showing boundaries of Federal  
Republic of Cameroon in 1961, inclusive of  
West and East Cameroon (Munji 2020).
Figure 5: Contemporary regional map of the Republic  
of Cameroon, inclusive of English-speaking regions  
of Southwest and Northwest (Munji 2020).
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3.2 Civil society and the quest for autonomy of 
English-speaking Cameroon
The format for the decolonisation of the British Southern 
Cameroons in 1961 and the subsequent constitutional 
and administrative arrangements in Cameroon did not go 
without objection from the realms of civil society, notably 
from academics and lawyers. In his seminal essay, Will 
we make or mar? (1964), ‘Professor [Bernard Nsokika] 
Fonlon, considered a regime of tax-gatherers and 
exploitation as an anathema; he abhorred a government 
of accumulation of private fortunes and the concomitant 
extortion of surplus value for the benefit of a few’ (cited in 
Besong, 2005:4). However, the most virulent objection 
to Cameroon’s constitutional and politico-administrative 
mutations prior to 1990 came from HRM Barrister Fon 
Gorji Dinka by way of an opuscule which he entitled The 
New Social Order (1985). What prompted Dinka’s (1985) 
writing was President Paul Biya’s unilateral decree and 
renaming of the country in 1984. Dinka (1985) described 
the 1972 referendum held by President Ahidjo as a 
constitutional coup, and President Biya’s decree 84/01 
as an act of secession of La République du Cameroun 
from the union with the Southern Cameroons. Dinka, 
however, simply said aloud what had already been 
the view of several Anglophone civil society activists 
and public personalities as early as 1962. Given the 
legally questionable way in which the union constitution 
and Federal Republic of Cameroon was created at 
the Foumban Constitutional Conference in 1961, 
some Southern Cameroons civil society activists and 
nationalists had long contended that there was no legal 
basis for the union, arguing that the Southern Cameroons 
Order in Council,1960 was still to be repealed (Southern 
Cameroons, 1960). Following the adoption of the 
1972 Constitution, there was an ever-growing number 
of dissenting voices and objections to a constitution 
that was perceived as part of a well-oiled plan to deny 
Southern Cameroons’ right to self-rule and dismantle its 
identity and freedoms. For those who held such views, 
this assimilation or annexation scheme had gradually been 
unpacked with measures such as the promulgation of 
Ordinance No. 62/OF/18 of 12 March 1962 relating to 
supression of subversive activities (Federal Republic of 
Cameroon, 1962) and the repeal of political pluralism in 
1966 (Berrih and Toko 2019: 34). 
However, in contrast, Mbarga (1973: 363) argued that ‘the 
procedure leading up to the 1972 referendum could not 
legally be taken to task because the referendum was the 
work of an original constituent power acting ex nihilo and 
not a derived constituent power acting on the basis of the 
Federal Constitution [of 1961]’ (cited in Nkot, 1999: 666). 
By this, Mbarga (1973) meant that the 1961 federation 
constituted a constituent power but then died and had no 
authority or influence on the 1972 referendum. However, 
the torrent of literature and memos that trailed Gorji Dinka’s 
text fly in the face of Mbarga’s position. These reflections 
mainly came from civil society actors in the English-
speaking North West and South West Provinces, created 
in June 1972 and later renamed as regions (Northwest 
region and Southwest region) from November 2008 
(Republic of Cameroon (2008). Ngwane (2003: 3) argued 
that these expressions ‘were echoes of an emasculated 
community needing legitimate and rational packaging’. 
However, in the context of the Cold War, such objections 
were often quashed or simply ignored by the government 
led by Francophones or personalities whose origins can 
be traced to one of the indigenous groups of ex-French 
Cameroun, which now makes up the other eight regions of 
the Cameroun Republic. 
Following the end of the Cold War in 1989/90, the debate 
resurfaced on the role of citizens in societal transformation 
in Cameroon in particular and in Africa in general, along 
with protest about the failure of African authoritarian 
states to provide minimum social, economic and political 
resources (Nkwi, 2006:1). In line with the wave of political 
liberalisation and democratisation that swept over sub-
Saharan Africa at this time, Biya’s government, in 1990, 
gave in to renewed pressure from civil society, notably 
students, trade unions, market women, lawyers, academics, 
and the church, and reinstated multi-party politics and 
democratic elections (Nkwi 2006). Most significantly 
for civil society activity, Law No 90/53 of December 
1990 on Freedom of Association was enacted to provide 
a legal framework for the registration and activities of 
CSOs (Republic of Cameroon, 1990). In the course of 
these developments, a section of civil society, chiefly 
Anglophone, re-tabled the question of the form of the state. 
The vibrancy of the Anglophone community to see the 
establishment of a more just, democratic and equal 
society was exemplified by the birth in Bamenda, capital 
of the Northwest region, of the Social Democrat Front 
(SDF), the first major opposition party in Cameroon, and 
the holding of the All Anglophone Conferences of 1993 
(AAC I in Buea, capital of the Southwest region) and 
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1994 (AAC II in Bamenda). A proposed return to two-
State federalism was the focal point of the 1994 AAC 
Declaration. However, the government refused to dialogue 
with leaders of the AAC, leading to the creation of the 
Southern Cameroons National Congress (SCNC) in 
August 1994 (Fonchingong 2013: 229), with the SCNC 
then launching a bid to separate the Southern Cameroons 
from the Republic of Cameroun (Achimbe, 2016: 513). 
Responding to these tensions that had emerged 
nationwide in the context of post-1990 democratisation in 
Africa, Biya’s government then embarked on constitutional 
reform. An amendment to the 1972 Constitution in January 
1996 introduced decentralisation within the unitary state 
structure, with the devolution of some powers to regions, 
albeit under strict supervision of the central government. 
In spite of such decentralisation, largely effective only 
on paper (Caxton 2017), reflections on the form of the 
Cameroonian State and calls for its revision did not cease. 
Against the backdrop of government’s refusal to return 
to a two-State Federation, albeit a more concrete one, 
scholars like Anyangwe (2010) and Ayim (2010) revisited 
the problem of the botched decolonisation process for 
the Southern Cameroons. They argued that the formula of 
‘independence by joining’ contravened the original United 
Nations (UN) Trusteeship Agreement and various UN 
laws and resolutions on the complete and unconditional 
decolonisation of African peoples and peoples elsewhere 
under colonial rule. Abwa (2015) has, however, refuted the 
existence of any basis for Anglophone self-rule. In Neither 
Anglophones nor Francophones: all Cameroonians. 
Historical Analysis Essay in Tribute to the late Prof. M. Z. 
Njeuma (2015), he argues that the Southern Cameroons 
cannot claim any existence outside the Kamerun 
boundaries. His school of thought has followers like 
LeVine (1971) and Elango (2006) who attempt to debunk 
an ‘Anglophone’ identity. Moreover, it is their dismissive 
and debatable views – Kamerun was a colony, not a 
State – and other similar arguments that have informed 
Cameroonian government policy on the Anglophone 
conflict. This approach produced over time a deepening 
malaise in the Anglophone community with ever-renewed 
grievances about marginalisation and increasing French 
influence. This erosion of the Anglo-Saxon heritage 
(language, culture, values) and Anglophone systems 
(political, educational, Common Law), in other words, 
of Anglophone identity, by political and administrative 
practices of the Francophone-dominated government have 
significantly reduced the life chances of Anglophones. 
Over time, this has put them in a disadvantaged position 
vis-à-vis their Francophone counterparts – the so-called 
‘Anglophone problem’ (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997; 
West Cameroon Association 2016). 
The longstanding nature of this ‘Anglophone problem’ 
has escalated from 2016 onwards to one of crisis 
and unprecedented conflict. As French influence in 
Anglophone institutions, notably law courts and schools, 
increased with negative consequences on standards 
and on access to justice and education, protests 
were again launched in October 2016 to decry the 
situation. As outlined in the Introduction, what began as 
peaceful protests by lawyers and teachers against the 
increased introduction of Francophone personnel and 
practices into courts and schools in the Anglophone 
regions subsequently escalated into civil conflict 
when government security forces responded to the 
peaceful protests by killings with machine guns and 
helicopter gunships, along with arbitrary arrests and 
torture. The initial peaceful protests in 2016 were led 
by the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium 
(CACSC), which proposed a return to the two-State 
federation that had been agreed to at independence 
in 1961, but which had then been unconstitutionally 
terminated by the Francophone-dominated government in 
1972. The brutal crackdown by the government against 
the peaceful protests in late 2016 and early 2017 led to 
separatist voices taking centre stage, with several armed 
groups emerging to fight for separation from French 
Cameroon and establish an independent state called 
Ambazonia, the name given to English-speaking regions 
of Cameroon by separatist sympathisers. In September 
2017, the first attacks on Cameroon military forces were 
recorded, and on 1 October 2017, separatist groups 
unilaterally declared independence for Ambazonia, 
leading to military occupation of the Anglophone regions 
and commencement of the civil war.
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Two years later, in response to internal and international 
outrage about almost daily atrocities and to calls for 
dialogue, the government organised a self-styled Major 
National Dialogue (MND) (Grand Dialogue National 
in French) in October 2019. The MND ignored the 
initiative of religious leaders who had called for an 
Anglophone General Conference as a necessary 
first step to identify issues for the MND and to select 
Anglophone representatives (International Crisis Group 
2018:1). The MND was also heavily criticised as being a 
monologue, given that separatist groups and moderate 
CSO actors were not invited to participate, as well as a 
dialogue without partners (Petrigh 2019). The MND did, 
however, make several recommendations, among which 
was a special status for Anglophones and the election 
of local governors (Chimtom 2019). Notwithstanding 
such recommendations, Dupuis (2019) concluded that 
the MND achieved nothing, and observed that fighting 
between government forces and separatists intensified 
after the dialogue. Against this background, a more visible 
role for CSOs in resolution of the conflict could, therefore, 
make a difference. However, this is partly dependent on 
the degree of civic space available.
3.3 The state of civic space in Cameroon 
The development of the civic space in Cameroon has 
largely followed the path of other African countries, as 
indicated in the preceding sub-section. Discussion on 
the subject shows that the civic space in Cameroon 
has undergone at least three phases of ‘mutation’ 
– precolonial, colonial and postcolonial – each 
characterised by varying degrees of civic activism in the 
Figure 6: Peaceful protest in English-speaking region of Cameroon before escalation of conflict in October 2017  
Photo credit: Pambazuka News https://www.pambazuka.org/human-security/president-paul-biya-and-cameroon’s-
anglophone-crisis
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social, economic and political life of the state (Awasom 
2005; Aziz 2019; Forje, 1999; Nkwi 2006; Vubo 2008). 
The present postcolonial phase can also be viewed in 
two distinct periods: the era of the first Republic under 
President Amadou Ahidjo (1960-1982) and that of 
the second Republic of President Paul Biya (1982 to 
present). As Aziz (2019) notes, in Amadou Ahidjo’s era, 
what was considered ‘civil society’ was loosely referred 
to as the ‘the voluntary sector’, and was mostly composed 
of religious denominations and agricultural work parties. 
Such organisations were generally encouraged and 
supported by the state in the provision of economic and 
socio-cultural services, while political parties and civic 
organisations were forced into a single party structure – 
the Cameroon National Union – to form a centralised one-
party state. Thus, the role of ‘civil society’ in Cameroon’s 
first Republic was largely restricted to socio-cultural and 
menial economic issues. This trend continued into the 
second Republic until the 1990s, following the formal 
adoption of political pluralism in 1990 (Vubo 2008). 
The post-1990 period witnessed a dramatic 
transformation in the ‘voluntary sector’ in Cameroon. 
Ngam Nkwi notes that religious groups and other 
associations became more vibrant and vocal as they 
focused beyond socio-cultural and economic issues and 
were ‘bent on opening and expanding the political space’ 
(Nkwi 2006: 95). During the early 1990s, individuals, 
students, religious groups and other organisations 
became more interested in seeking redress to the 
economic, social and political woes that were affecting 
Cameroonians. Indeed, political activism during this time 
was marked by what Aziz (2019: 54) referred to as ‘civilian 
group militancy’ for freedom, justice and good governance 
against what was perceived as the authoritarian and 
repressive one-party regime of Paul Biya. As noted above, 
in December 1990, Biya’s regime bowed to pressure 
and enacted Law No. 90/053 on freedom of association, 
thereby repealing Law No. 67/LF/19 of 12 June 1967 
on the labour code (Federal Republic of Cameroon, 
1967). This launched the new age of civil society in 
Cameroon, and subsequently over 3,000 associations 
mushroomed in Cameroon (Tsanga 2013: 4). These are 
comprised of both official registered associations and 
non-registered ones. Registered associations include 
NGOs, trade unions, cooperative movements, common 
initiative groups, private media, churches, professional 
associations, development associations, student 
associations, and feminist organisations. In addition, other 
non-registered groups engage in significant activity within 
the civil society space, notably separatist movements, 
religious fundamentalist groups, ethnic movements and 
secret societies (Nyambo 2008: 48). As the categories 
suggests, these CSOs are involved in different aspects 
of life in Cameroon, spanning social, religious, cultural, 
economic and political aspects. 
However, despite the flurry of activity to establish 
CSOs and the initial optimism that was generated, the 
civic space shrank almost as quickly as it emerged, 
with sustained military crackdown on protests and 
demonstrations. For example, between March and August 
1991, dozens died in violent clashes with the army across 
the country, including on the University of Yaoundé I 
campus (International Crisis Group 2010) and on 6 June 
1992 when government troops attacked Ndu Market 
and killed men, women and children and tortured dozens 
(Cameroon News Agency 2017). Nyambo (2008) notes 
the attitude of the state in creating a legal space for civic 
action in Cameroon ‘has been one of both caution and 
repression’ (2008: 47). In other words, while the primary 
legislation on Freedom of Association – Law No 90/053 
of 19 December 1990 – granted rights and freedoms 
for individuals and groups to create associations, 
the same law and subsequent ones and their texts of 
application also curbed such rights. For instance, Law 
No 90/053 also states that, apart from public utility 
associations, CSO cannot obtain subventions, gifts 
or donations (article 11) (Nyambo 2008). Access to 
legitimate support, including financial support, is critical 
in enabling the work of CSOs. Thus, any law prohibiting 
access to funding limits the ability of CSOs to thrive in 
an already challenging (financial) resource context like 
that of Cameroon. Moreover, the state has wide-ranging 
powers to dissolve any CSO if it feels the said association 
threatens the security of the state, especially regarding 
national integrity and unity. Thus, politically, there are 
limits to what CSOs can get involved in, especially when 
it concerns discussion on the form of the state – a major 
issue widely regarded as the main bone of contention 
in the current Cameroon ‘Anglophone’ crisis (Awasom 
2020; Konings and Nyamnjoh, 1997). For instance, 
on 17 January 2017, at the start of the current crisis, 
Cameroon’s Ministry of Territorial Administration issued 
an order banning the activities of the Southern Cameroon 
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National Council (SCNC) and the Cameroon Anglophone 
Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) – a group of CSOs 
who had led the peaceful protests that emerged in late 
2016 (Amnesty International, 2017). The government then 
arrested and imprisoned some CACSC leaders, while 
many others fled the country (Bama, 2017). 
This is not atypical; a common constraint on the civic 
space in Cameroon is the harassment, intimidation and 
attacks on CSO activists and human rights defenders. The 
CIVICUS Monitor, an index which measures civic space 
globally has, for the past four years, classified the civic 
space in Cameroon as repressed (CIVICUS 2020). This 
means that the work of CSOs is regularly impeded, and 
they face threats of de-registration and closure by the state. 
In addition, active individuals and civil society members 
who criticise power holders risk surveillance, harassment, 
intimidation, imprisonment, injury and even death. Thus, 
despite the plethora of CSOs registered in Cameroon 
since the 1990s, the civic space in Cameroon has largely 
remained constrained. CSOs can operate but only under 
strict, at times self-imposed, limitations. They understand 
that if they step out of line and act in a manner that is 
perceived by the state as oppositional, they risk unwelcome 
attention and potential repression from state authorities.
In sum, despite the resurgence of CSOs in the early 1990s 
and the formal registration of large numbers of NGOs, the 
civic space in Cameroon has remained limited, especially 
for organisations engaging in the broad political sphere. 
Available civic space was then subject to further shrinkage 
with the escalation of the Anglophone crisis from late 2016. 
A clampdown on CSO activities occurred, most notably the 
banning of the Consortium (CACSC) on 17 January 2017, 
and the space for CSOs has subsequently remained highly 
restricted. The government appears to perceive any effort 
to contribute to the resolution of the conflict as against its 
interests, or worse, as terrorism. Perhaps this limitation 
of civic space was most apparent in the government’s 
obstruction of the initiative of religious leaders, led by the 
Archbishop Emeritus of Douala, Cardinal Tumi, to organise 
an Anglophone General Conference in August 2018 and 
again in November 2018, thus obstructing articulation of 
the grievances of the English-speaking population. Yet, 
despite such constraints, local CSOs in the Anglophone 
regions have responded in a variety of ways to the conflict 
and its adverse effects on local populations, as examined in 
the next section.
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Several roles have been attributed to CSOs in conflict 
situations. Some of the main contributions include 
mediation and facilitation of dialogue; information and 
citizen education; participation of citizens in local security 
governance and early warning mechanisms; advancement 
of positive societal values; and organisation of associations 
for economic and social development (Cooper 2018: 
9-10; Nyirabikali 2016: 7-10). While the banning of 
CACSC and imprisonment of its leaders in January 2017 
threatened to even deny the symbolic existence of CSOs 
in the Anglophone regions, many CSOs have risen to the 
challenge and have been actively engaged in peaceful 
attempts at resolution of the ongoing Anglophone conflict. 
We now turn to examine the role they have played so far. 
We identify five inter-related areas where CSOs have 
contributed to conflict resolution: humanitarian relief; peace 
campaigns; documentation of human rights violations; 
trauma healing; and peace education.
 
4.1 Humanitarian action
The provision of humanitarian relief is considered by 
some scholars and practitioners to be an important 
conflict resolution activity. It is perceived by Bigdon and 
Korf (2002: 3), for instance, as one of the activities that 
local and international NGOs can undertake in efforts to 
transform a conflict. Most CSOs involved in this study 
indicated their role in providing humanitarian relief, notably 
to internally displaced persons (IDPs), both within the 
conflict zones and in other parts of the country where 
they have sought refuge, and to civilians who remain in 
their communities within the affected areas. Faced with 
the urgent needs of local populations due to the conflict, 
some NGOs have reoriented their activities entirely from 
development to humanitarian work. Humanitarian relief 
such as food, medicines and shelter has been provided, at 
times in conjunction with international organisations. Many 
areas in the conflict zones are inaccessible to international 
organisations, including UN agencies, and thus the role of 
local NGOs has been crucial. Lange and Quinn (2003: 7) 
contend that ‘inter-community dialogue and community-
level peacebuilding may be fragile without humanitarian 
assistance to material needs, like food, shelter and health’. 
They note that such material assistance strengthens the 
capacity of the affected population to resist the effects 
of violent attacks by making available food and shelter, 
among other needs (Lange and Quinn 2003: 21-22). 
Our findings were that the provision of humanitarian 
relief to affected civilian populations in Cameroon was 
important for two interrelated reasons: basic needs and 
solidarity. First, the adverse impact of the conflict on 
affected civilian populations has made it imperative that 
CSOs respond to their immediate needs through the 
provision of food, health services and shelter, including 
to those IDPs who have fled into the bush to seek refuge. 
Some organisations have conducted preliminary needs 
assessments to determine the basic needs of the people 
and identify those most in need of humanitarian support, 
with provision of immediate relief. Such assessments 
have then guided the humanitarian intervention strategies 
of international organisations. Other local CSOs have 
focused on the most vulnerable, for instance people with 
disabilities, who may have limited access to humanitarian 
assistance, as well as less opportunity to escape from 
the violence. Second, as well as an essential response 
to the deprivations suffered by civilian populations, the 
provision of humanitarian assistance has been significant 
in expressing solidarity and enhancing the legitimacy 
and reputation of the CSOs in their engagement with 
local communities and groups of IDPs. The humanitarian 
relief provided has demonstrated concern and practical 
support for local people, and shown the preparedness 
of CSO workers to take risks in entering the conflict 
zones, given the threats coming from both the military and 
armed separatists. For example, some CSOs have gone 
to remote villages in order to reach injured persons and 
transport them for treatment to Doctors Without Borders 
based in some major cities. Threats were real, with CSO 
staff sometimes kidnapped by armed separatists. Related 
to their humanitarian work, CSOs have also provided 
livelihood training to assist those, notably IDPs, who 
have been deprived of their livelihoods. For instance, one 
organisation undertook a project called ‘Empower Her’ 
which provided training in sewing and hairdressing for  
25 female IDPs. 
4.2 Peace campaigns
Another important contribution of CSOs has been that 
of waging campaigns for peace. Workshop discussions 
revealed that female-led CSOs, in particular, have 
been very active and vocal in campaigns such as ‘Back 
to school’, ‘Stop burning health facilities’, ‘Stop the 
killings’, ‘We want dialogue’ and ‘Cease fire’, aimed 
4. Contributions of CSOs to the Resolution  
of Cameroon’s ‘Anglophone’ Conflict
21CONTRIBUTIONS OF CSOs TO THE RESOLUTION OF CAMEROON’S ‘ANGLOPHONE’ CONFLICT
at bringing national and international attention to 
the ongoing atrocities. Such campaigns were given 
particular impetus by the establishment, in May 2018, 
of the Southwest/Northwest Women’s Task Force 
(SNWOT) by leaders of women’s organisations and 
individual female activists. As the organisation itself 
states, it was ‘born as a result of the crisis with the 
mission to contribute as catalysts and agents of peace 
in the two troubled regions of Cameroon’.3 SNWOT 
has undertaken various activities at different levels, and 
direct peace campaigning has been a central element. 
Figure 7: Members of Southwest/Northwest Women Task Force (SNWOT) protesting in Buea, Cameroon 
Photo credit: Southwest/Northwest Women’s Task Force (SNWOT) (2020)
3. https://snwot.org/about-us/
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One effective action has been ‘lamentation campaigns’, 
for example, undertaken in 2018 in the regional capitals 
of Buea and Bamenda and involving the participation of 
over one thousand women. Through wailing, the women’s 
lamentation called for a ceasefire and dialogue between the 
conflict parties,4 as well as seeking to bring more national 
and international attention to the crisis (Tebeck 2019). 
The condemnation of the war by women wailing publicly 
is a revered conflict resolution ritual in most communities 
in Cameroon and is seen as a condemnation of violence 
(Wright 2015). The lamentation campaigns were major 
events that attracted significant media coverage. Other 
public demonstrations have called for a ceasefire and 
peaceful resolution of the conflict, with SNWOT activists 
adopting an orange headscarf as a symbol of nonviolence. 
Figure 8: Lamentation campaign by members of SNWOT 
Photo credit: Southwest/Northwest Women’s Task Force (SNWOT) (2020)
4. https://snwot.org/about-us/
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SNWOT has campaigned for peace at different levels 
and by different means. As well as public demonstrations, 
SNWOT has made direct appeals to the government to 
resolve the conflict through holding press conferences. 
Additionally, on 10 December 2018, 150 members 
undertook a public march in Yaoundé calling for an 
immediate ceasefire and inclusive dialogue. In the lead 
up to the Major National Dialogue, SNWOT also visited 
the Prime Minister on 24 September 2019 to submit their 
recommendations on how they believed the dialogue could 
best be organised.5 When government was unresponsive, 
SNWOT persisted in demanding access and took direct 
action to gain entry into the official Major National Dialogue 
sessions in Yaoundé on 30 September 2019 in order to 
make women’s voices heard.6
A key area of campaigning pertains to the incidents 
of rape and gender-based violence that have 
accompanied the conflict, with CSO representatives 
describing the situation as one of ‘rampant subjection 
to rape’ and ‘wanton abuse of sexual rights of women 
and girls’.7 SNWOT, for example, has consistently 
drawn attention to issues of rape and gender-based 
violence in its campaigns and public demonstrations, 
as indicated in the placards in figure below 
Figure 9: SNWOT campaigns for peace in the English-speaking regions 
Photo credit: Southwest/Northwest Women’s Task Force (SNWOT) (2020)
5. https://snwot.org/cameroon-snwot-meeting-with-prime-minister/
6. Opening Plenary, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
7. Opening Plenary, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
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The inter-related nature of public campaigning and 
practical support is also evident here, with SNWOT and 
other women-led CSOs providing safe spaces for women 
and girls, including in the bush, as well as kits to ensure 
proper menstrual hygiene.  
4.3 Documentation of human rights violations
CSOs have played a major role in documenting and 
reporting on human rights violations and other heinous 
crimes committed since the start of the conflict. CSOs 
for example have documented and reported on numerous 
mass killings, including that in the village of Ngarbuh 
on 14 February 2020 in which at least 21 people, 
including 13 children and a pregnant woman, were 
killed.8 Such documentation by the Centre for Human 
Rights and Democracy in Africa (CHRDA) and other 
NGOs has led to higher-level attention and, at times, 
investigations being undertaken, such as occurred in 
the case of the Ngarbuh Massacre (Human Rights 
Watch 2020). Above all, the documentation of human 
rights violations and campaigns for investigations into 
war crimes makes the need for a peaceful solution more 
visible to all parties. In a situation where mainstream 
media, especially Francophone media coverage, has 
been very limited, the work done by CSOs has served to 
remind the warring parties of their legal obligations and 
afforded some protection, albeit limited, to the civilian 
population. It was the view of one CSO representative 
that this has at least prevented some atrocities through 
an increased awareness of the consequences of violating 
human rights.9 This finding corroborates the argument 
of scholars such as Babbitt (2011) who contends that 
human rights issues are ‘key components of parties’ 
interests and concerns’ and that human rights norms are 
important in reinforcing the idea that state sovereignty 
cannot be separated from its responsibility to protect 
civilians. Some CSOs such as CHRDA (Ajumane 2018) 
and the Cameroonian Association for Bible Translation 
and Literacy (US House of Representatives 2018) have 
delivered statements on Cameroon’s Anglophone conflict 
in important international policy spaces. In June 2018, for 
instance, the founder and chairman of CHRDA presented 
a paper on the Anglophone crisis at a hearing of the US 
House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(US House of Representatives 2018). CSO workshop 
participants felt that such testimonies have had some 
impact.10 Barnes (2006) contends that civil society 
initiatives are sometimes ‘crucial in directing attention 
to a situation that is unacceptable but which has been 
avoided by the wider public, a silence that effectively 
underpins the status quo’, adding that ‘the very act of 
public disclosure and/or denouncing the situation can 
make the truth evident in ways that are very difficult to 
ignore and may empower people to take action to change 
the situation’ (2006: 34). 
 
4.4 Trauma healing
Another important contribution relates to issues of 
mental health and trauma healing. One of the problems 
associated with contemporary wars which makes conflict 
resolution difficult is trauma. Egbejule (2018) has shown 
that trauma is a major consequence of the Cameroon 
Anglophone conflict. In this research, the leader of one 
CSO noted that ‘there has been an increase in mental 
health problems among youths as a result of the conflict’.11 
Another confirmed that traumatic experiences were 
widespread, highlighting that ‘the elderly, people that 
have experienced kidnapping, those with gun wounds, 
people whose houses and/or businesses have been 
destroyed, are all suffering from post-traumatic stress 
disorders’.12 The widespread incidents of rape and 
gender-based violence is another source of trauma. It 
was stated by workshop participants that many people 
in the conflict areas as well as IDPs in the neighbouring 
towns and cities are suffering from trauma resulting from 
the experiences they have lived through since the start 
8. Interview with CSO, 15 May 2020, Buea
9. Focus Group Discussion, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
10. Opening Plenary, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
11. Interview with CSO, 8 May 2020, Buea
12. Interview with CSO, 8 May 2020, Buea
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of the conflict, and will need to heal to be able to relate 
with wider society in a peaceful manner.13 In response, 
CSOs have provided psychological and mental health 
support to women and children who have been affected 
by the conflict.14 For example, a consortium of four CSOs 
has established a network in the city of Kumba to provide 
psychosocial support and the referral of victims/survivors 
of gender-based violence.15 The objective of such healing 
is to help those affected to get relief from their pain and 
prevent potential conflict behaviour. Although there is 
limited research on the relevance of psychosocial relief in 
resolving conflicts (Cairns 1996; Shalev and McFarlane 
2000), some scholars such as Herman (1992: 50) have 
shown that traumatic events, in addition to effects on the 
psychological structures of self, also affect the systems 
of attachment and meaning that link a person to their 
community. It is in this vein that Mujawayo (2014) has 
stated that ‘people need to find peace inside themselves 
before they can build a peaceful society’. Bigdon and Korf 
(2002) identify trauma therapy as one of the activities that 
NGOs and other local actors engage in to contribute to 
long term transformative change in conflict situations. 
 
4.5 Peace education
Civil society organisations have also contributed to 
conflict resolution by designing and implementing peace 
education/sensitisation programmes. One organisation, 
for example, carried out some training on peace education 
in the village of a staff member, which had been burnt 
down. The objective of the training was to educate the 
youths and convince them not to retaliate. The same 
organisation also organised a ‘seminar to educate the 
victims and try to make them understand that all hope 
is not lost’.16 This is consistent with findings from other 
studies such as the one by Awinador-Kanyirige (2014) 
in Ghana in which he argued that peace education 
and peace talks initiated and implemented by CSOs 
helped to de-escalate ethnic-based conflicts between 
the Konkomba and Nanumba/Dagomba ethnic groups 
and between the Gonja and Nawari/Konkomba groups 
in Northern Ghana. Similarly, Fischer (2011: 300) found 
that, following the end of the war in Bosnia in 1995, some 
CSOs became ‘active in cross-border peace education, 
striving to establish norms of tolerance and deal with 
prejudices and enemy images’. 
The above contributions show that CSOs have played 
a crucial role in identifying the needs and views of local 
people whose lives have been affected by the conflict, 
and have responded directly to these and brought 
them to policy spaces. For CSOs to effectively bridge 
the gap between local communities and policy actors, 
however, they need adequate resources and an enabling 
environment. The role CSOs can play in resolving 
the ongoing conflict is thus limited by the challenges 
associated with restricted and shrinking civic spaces in 
the conflict-affected regions, to which we now turn.
13. Opening Plenary, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
14. Focus Group Discussion, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
15. Focus Group Discussion, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
16. Focus Group Discussion, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
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As discussed above, even before the outbreak of full-
scale conflict between Cameroon’s security forces and 
separatist fighters, CSOs in Cameroon already faced 
significant constraints after the start of mass protests 
in 2016. These ranged from restrictions on access 
to income, intimidation, physical attacks and threats 
of closure, most notably the banning of CACSC and 
imprisonment of its leaders in January 2017. The CSO 
representatives involved in this study noted how such 
restrictions intensified immediately prior to the outbreak 
of conflict and have persisted throughout. In particular, 
workshop participants identified the following constraints: 
administrative restrictions and manipulation; intimidation, 
control and surveillance of CSO activities; security 
threats and attacks on CSO properties and persons; and 
financial challenges. In addition to these constraints that 
stem from the external environment and the context of 
shrinking space, CSO representatives also noted some 
challenges internal to the NGO sector. These constraints 
and challenges are discussed in turn below. 
5.1 Administrative restrictions and control
Administrative restrictions were noted as a major means 
of limiting CSOs’ access to conflict-affected communities. 
While CSOs acknowledged that access problems could 
be due at times to geographical remoteness, it was the 
administrative restrictions that were most frustrating. 
For example, a recurrent issue for most CSOs was 
that ‘Divisional [administrative] Officers do not issue 
authorisation for civil society organisations to carry out 
their activities in their various constituencies’.17 Thus, 
even when CSOs are able to overcome access issues 
related to geographical remoteness, local administrative 
officials do not grant access for them to visit such areas. 
This restriction therefore impedes on CSOs’ ability to 
address the needs of some of the most marginalised 
and vulnerable people in the conflict. Even when CSOs 
are finally granted access, they can be faced with other 
restrictions. A CSO representative noted that ‘The military 
interferes in the humanitarian deliveries of CSOs by 
sometimes wanting to accompany them to the field and 
by so doing endangering the lives of their staff through 
crossfire exchange with the Amba [separatists] boys’.18 
While the military generally frames its accompaniment of 
CSO teams to rural locations as being for the ‘security of 
CSO staff’, the main intent is perceived to be surveillance 
of CSOs and their engagement with local communities 
and separatist fighters. Some CSOs have been accused 
of working with separatist fighters in the conflict, with staff 
monitored and questioned by the state secret service 
(Ngano 2020; Quenum 2020). Another administrative 
restriction is the censorship imposed on CSO activities. 
The participants noted that the government, through 
different administrative officials at the sub-district, district 
and regional levels, prevents CSOs from providing/
sharing information on the situation of people in the 
affected communities. A respondent noted that CSOs 
face a ‘communication challenge. CSOs are not allowed 
to provide relevant information emanating from the field’.19 
This could be seen as an attempt by the state to remain as 
provider of the sole narrative of the Anglophone conflict, 
silencing the voices and closing the civic space of non-
state actors. The consequences of violation of such 
censorship can range from a fine to imprisonment or an 
outright ban, as meted out to CACSC.  
5.2 CSO-government relations and sector discord
The representative of a teachers’ organisation noted 
further complexities on how administrative manipulation 
impacted on CSOs’ autonomy and ability to contribute 
to peaceful change, yet simultaneously perceived this as 
being partly dependent on CSOs’ own decisions with 
regard to their closeness or distance from government:
...CSOs operate according to the context of the 
government. That means they operate the way 
the government conditions them to. In Cameroon, 
for a civil society organisation to operate freely 
 
5. Challenges faced by CSOs 
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and significantly contribute to peaceful change, it 
will depend on the nature of its relations with the 
government. This implies that some of these CSOs 
are government-sponsored and operate within such 
contexts. Under such conditions, it is difficult for such 
CSOs to make meaningful contributions because 
they dance to the tune of the government. Sometimes 
CSOs can pressure the government to buy their 
ideas, but that depends on the level of autonomy and 
distance they maintain from government.20
In such an environment of occasional suspicion, 
collaboration among CSOs is weakened where 
CSOs may be pursuing respectively different agendas 
dependent on their distance/closeness to government. 
However, some workshop participants went further in their 
critique of internal shortcomings within the CSO sector. 
It was stated that some CSOs are focused on ‘promoting 
self-interests rather than collaboration’, suggesting that 
they ‘don’t have the spirit to look beyond a selfish, self-
centred syndrome’, what was referred to as the ‘pull him 
down syndrome’.21 Perhaps the banning of CACSC and 
imprisonment of its key leaders has intimidated others, 
resulting in a successful ‘divide and rule’ strategy by 
government. However, for some respondents, the crux 
of the problem of lack of collaboration lay with CSOs 
themselves, with some seen as ‘selfish and exhibit[ing] 
a myopic mindset’, while other CSO activists ‘turn up 
[engage in conflict resolution efforts] but join politics’.22 
This occasional discord between CSOs was exacerbated 
in a situation where some CSOs are perceived as 
sponsored by government and therefore supportive of 
government interests. The pursuit of individual interests, 
along with the ‘divide and rule’ strategy of government, 
means that there was ‘lack of synergy among CSOs’23 
in conflict resolution efforts. This failure to engage in 
sustained collaboration makes the voice of CSOs weaker 
and consequently their engagement in addressing the 
conflict is less effective. 
5.3 Security threats
Another challenge for CSOs is the direct threat to life 
and property from both warring parties. The workshop 
discussions with CSOs’ representatives revealed that 
the risk to their property and that of their staff is quite 
high since ‘the military on their part considers everybody 
as an enemy and they shoot anyhow and do not seem to 
protect members of the civil society’.24 For instance, the 
offices of the Network of Human Rights Defenders in 
Central Africa (REDHAC), an influential CSO based in 
Douala, Cameroon, has been broken into by unidentified 
armed men on several occasions, with documents and 
equipment confiscated on other occasions, and leaders 
and other staff subjected to continuous harassment and 
intimidation. Although the break-ins and other incidents 
have been reported to the police, no formal investigation 
has taken place (CIVICUS et al. 2017). Such a fate has 
befallen other CSOs in Cameroon (Human Rights Watch 
2019). In addition, NGO staff can be targeted by the 
armed separatist groups. The very real nature of this threat 
was evident in that two members of CSOs present at the 
workshop had themselves been kidnapped by separatist 
groups in Kumba and Batibo respectively.25 These 
experiences had been very frightening for both individuals 
and they had required time to recover from physical 
injuries and, especially, from the mental trauma.26 Such 
risks clearly impact on CSOs’ ability to effectively carry 
out their activities towards conflict resolution, echoing 
evidence from other cases that a threat to basic security 
for CSO staff makes it ‘difficult for them to engage in and 
support peace making’ (Barnes 2006: 46). 
20. Focus Group Discussion, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
21. Focus Group Discussion, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
22. Focus Group Discussion, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
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24. Focus Group Discussion, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
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5.4 Financial challenges 
The inability of CSOs to access legitimate funds through 
gifts and donations is a further strategic civic space 
constraint. Workshop participants noted that CSOs’ 
lack of financial resources greatly impeded their ability 
to effectively contribute to conflict resolution activities. 
While foreign donor assistance, such as from international 
NGOs, could provide avenues for them to access financial 
resources, they are often only available with conditions. As 
one CSO representative noted, ‘International organisations 
come with money and would always want to decide and 
dictate on what civil society should do and should not do’.27 
Moreover, such sources of income are highly competitive 
and many local grassroots NGOs miss out on them, greatly 
impacting on their conflict resolution efforts. 
In sum, issues and challenges here are complex. CSOs 
operate in a difficult environment in a situation of conflict. 
Ultimately there is risk to the personal security of staff 
and an existential threat to the organisation. Such 
threats come from powerful and armed actors. In such 
contexts, CSOs may have little choice but to work within 
government-imposed parameters, while being somewhat 
creative in their interpretation. Yet there are also some 
difficult choices. Some CSOs may opt to gravitate more 
towards government as a way of protecting and promoting 
their own interests, resulting at times in a degree of 
discord within the sector. Competition between NGOs 
over financial resources is common in many contexts, but 
the additional challenges faced in a conflict environment, 
especially where manipulated by government, can 
exacerbate such divisions precisely when maximum 
solidarity and collaboration is required to end violence and 
achieve peace. We turn next to consider how CSOs have 
responded to such challenges and attempted to counter 
shrinking civic space.
27. Opening Plenary, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
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How can civil society open the space that is closing? 
Participants were invited to share the strategies they 
have adopted or believe they could employ to counter it. 
Despite all the challenges faced, participants have adopted 
several strategies aimed at overcoming such challenges 
in an environment where civic space is under attack. 
These include awareness raising; documentation; CSO 
mobilisation, networking and coalition-building; training 
and sensitisation campaigns; dialogue and communication. 
Workshop participants also considered neutrality, 
consistency, and building capacity in conflict analysis as 
important in pushing back against pressure on civic space.
 
6.1 Awareness raising by CSOs on their role
Participants were of the view that hostility towards CSOs 
by parties in the conflict was sometimes the result of limited 
knowledge of their role. They felt that people, including policy 
makers and conflict actors, could be ill-informed about the 
role of CSOs, and thus unable to distinguish between legal 
and non-legal restrictions on their activities. Difficulties in 
obtaining support outside of the Anglophone regions for 
CSO conflict resolution initiatives were also explained by the 
limited awareness of the conflict in other regions and within 
the international community. It is in this vein that women’s 
groups organised a peace march in Yaoundé on 18 April 
2019 (Kindzeka 2019) to raise awareness of the need to 
end the fighting and engage in a peaceful approach to 
resolve the conflict, inclusive of their role in this. Obtaining 
such outside support was also considered important 
by two rights-based organisations. They suggested that 
CSOs needed to raise awareness about the legitimacy of 
their activities among stakeholders and the wider citizen 
body using different channels including social media and 
traditional media spaces.28 This is consistent with the 
argument of Ayvazyan (2019: 20) who states that raising 
‘awareness for the plight of civil society with the public 
is of great importance’. Ayvazyan regrets, however, that 
such campaigns organised by CSOs often focus on 
confrontational narratives, and cautions that awareness 
raising ‘should concentrate on the importance of civil society 
and its role in the development of society’ (2019: 20). 
Similarly, Baldus et al. (2019: 24), in a study of civil society 
efforts in several cases to prevent civic space restrictions, 
found that awareness-raising campaigns, together with 
advocacy and targeted lobbying, were key to success. 
6.2 Documentation and quality of data
Documentation of violent events in general and violations 
of human rights in particular was seen as crucial. Two 
aspects were considered important. The first was to link 
documentation of abuses by both sides to international 
human rights law and to send information of violations to 
international human rights organisations such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch. Relating abuses 
to international human rights law makes the information 
more comprehensible for international human rights 
organisations and actors.29 Networking with international 
human rights organisations helps draw the attention of 
the warring parties to the consequences of violating 
international law and the legal requirement to prevent 
atrocities.30 Such networking also provides support 
to local human rights organisations and a degree of 
protection against retaliation from both warring parties in a 
context where their work is perceived as ‘confrontational’ 
by government and their own security regularly threatened 
by both the military and the separatists.31 The second 
important aspect was to ensure the accuracy of all 
such data. The representative of one human rights 
organisation noted that ‘facts’ obtained from social media 
sources were not always checked, and emphasised the 
importance of having reliable local people on the ground 
to corroborate accounts of atrocities. According to 
another workshop participant, CSOs ‘cannot speak until 
they have the facts’ and ‘when government knows that 
what they [CSOs] are saying is true, then they cannot 
contest it’.32 This can mean the government is more likely 
to collaborate with CSOs if they consistently report 
accurate and factual information. 
6. Strategies to Counter Shrinking 
Civic Spaces
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6.3 Mobilisation, networking and coalition building
Mobilisation into more effective organisational forms was 
another important strategy. This was most notable amongst 
women’s organisations, especially with the formation of 
SNWOT in May 2018. By bringing together a variety of 
organisations to focus on one issue – the conflict and its 
adverse impact on women in particular – SNWOT was able 
to undertake various activities at different levels in a stronger 
and more effective manner, including the encouragement of 
local mobilisation. At the local level across the two regions, 
SNWOT had ‘mobilised grassroots women’s groups in 
areas plagued by current conflict’.33 They sensitised such 
groups ‘on different issues related to their security, health, 
reproductive health, sexual rights, especially within the context 
of conflict’, with local women ‘becoming more aware of their 
rights’, notably around gender-based violence.34 SNWOT’s 
collective confidence and strength was indicated by the public 
demonstrations and sit-down protests discussed above, as 
well as their direct action to gain access to the official Major 
National Dialogue in Yaoundé. Women representatives 
stated that they would not have had the courage previously 
to take such direct action, but self-organisation and 
mobilisation as women had enabled them to do so.35 
Closely related to mobilisation is CSO networking and 
coalition building, also considered crucial by workshop 
participants. It was stated that it was not possible for 
CSOs to achieve impact if they worked in isolation.36 
Networking took place locally as well as nationally 
and internationally. As noted above, strong links with 
international organisations are especially important for 
local human rights organisations, enabling their voices to 
be heard and bringing abuses to national and international 
attention, and offering a degree of protection.37 
The most significant examples of coalition building are 
again SNWOT and the Civil Society Platform for Peace in 
Cameroon. SNWOT was formed as a coalition of women’s 
organisations and individual female activists, and its strength 
derives from this. Similarly, as noted by one representative, 
the formation of the Civil Society Platform for Peace in 
Cameroon brought together a coalition of over 30 youth-
led organisations, bloggers and journalists. Its strength in 
numbers has reinforced its calls for an immediate ceasefire 
and genuine inclusive dialogue, and also provided impetus 
to the Back to School campaign.38 There was general 
agreement among participants of the importance of 
coalition building in order to influence policies and decision 
making. It was especially recommended that individual 
CSOs should each focus on a particular ‘niche’ area and 
then come together in a united coalition in a synergistic way 
where different areas of expertise are complementary. As 
noted by Barnes (2006: 21), networks of CSOs working 
together can benefit from the strength that comes from 
unity in ways not available outside such frameworks. 
6.4 Training and sensitisation campaigns
Another important strategy has been training and sensitisation 
campaigns at the local level. In what could be considered 
as a ‘created space’ (Cornwall 2002) in which to develop 
a critical consciousness, CSOs have undertaken training 
on peacebuilding as well as on various rights issues that 
are encountered in conflict contexts. For example, training 
workshops on peace building and economic empowerment 
for women have been organised by ‘Mother of Hope 
Cameroon (MOHC 2020), while similar training sessions 
organised by Local Youth Corner (LOYOC) on peacebuilding 
and countering violent extremism (BBC News, 16 June 2018) 
have targeted young people. Other CSOs have been training 
youths and women on community mediation skills and how 
to engage with community and family members involved in 
armed groups in attempts to persuade them to drop their 
weapons.39 Women-led organisations have also undertaken 
much education work with young girls on gender-based 
violence (GBV) and sexual rights.40 CSOs also equipped 
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themselves better to deal with the new context of conflict 
by undergoing training courses themselves on conflict-
related matters.41 One women’s organisation, for instance, 
has built its capacity by having staff attend a number of 
UN training programmes in Cameroon and in Kenya on 
women’s leadership in peace processes.42  
6.5 Dialogue and communication
Dialogue and communication at various levels was another 
important strategy pursued by CSOs, and again counters 
shrinking space by seeking to create space. Dialogue 
with people in local communities was prioritised by some 
organisations, while others focused on encouraging 
government to hold a more inclusive dialogue.43 Some 
CSOs have also gone the extra mile by meeting directly 
with the separatists and with the government in attempts 
to persuade them to cease fire and meet at the negotiation 
table. Importantly, they have been able to access areas 
where the conflict is intense and have met with different 
local groups. This has enabled dialogue with communities 
about the conflict, its impact and how to resolve it. The 
perspectives of those most affected people are then fed 
back to government and diplomatic missions. 
Such community-level dialogue has engaged particularly 
with women, with SNWOT and its constituent 
organisations at the forefront. One focus of such dialogue 
has been on getting young people ‘to drop arms’. Some 
CSOs have met with local government officials to engage 
them in discussions about international humanitarian 
law and the need to intervene in attempts to stop the 
shootings.44 Such initiatives by CSOs have also involved 
dialogue with regional governors in the Northwest and 
Southwest regions, aimed at bringing local perspectives 
to their attention.45 In this vein, it was felt important 
to build a strong communication network with both 
government and separatist organisations, talking with both 
in a peaceful manner in which NGOs can be the ‘voice 
of the people’.46 The role of CSOs in facilitating dialogue 
that considers the experiences and needs of those 
most-affected civilians was considered crucial, not least 
because political representation has failed. Participants 
agreed it was imperative that local people’s voices should 
be heard directly – what is necessary is ‘not a dialogue in 
Yaoundé but in communities’.47 
Notwithstanding such views on the importance of 
dialogue at the local level, CSOs were afforded what 
can only be described as a very restricted role in the 
government-led Major National Dialogue, held from 30 
September to 4 October 2019 in Yaoundé. This was a 
significant limitation on their influence, with ‘very little 
space given to civil society actors’.48 This restriction is 
what led SNWOT to take direct action, after persistent 
requests were ignored, to gain entry into the Major 
National Dialogue sessions. According to one female 
CSO representative, there was also a degree of self-
critique of their lack of inclusion and a determination that 
‘next time they should be included more’.49 
Such efforts at open communication and dialogue 
with all parties were considered important for making 
their activities as CSOs less threatening to the warring 
parties and the population at large. This was especially 
aimed at countering the constraints associated with the 
warring parties; i.e. on the one hand the suspicions of 
the separatists of CSOs as working for the government 
and thus operating as spies, and on the other hand 
the suspicions of the government of CSOs as being 
oppositional and/or working with the separatists.
41. Focus Group Discussion, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
42. Focus Group Discussion, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
43. Focus Group Discussion, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
44. Focus Group Discussion, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
45. Focus Group Discussion, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
46. Focus Group Discussion, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
47. Focus Group Discussion, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
48. Focus Group Discussion, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
49. Opening Plenary, CSO Workshop, 29 January 2020, Douala
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Cameroon is currently in a critical situation. Conflict rages 
between the military and armed separatists in the two 
English-speaking regions, with severe consequences 
for civilian populations, especially in the rural areas. 
The conflict is unprecedented in post-independence 
Cameroon and is in urgent need of resolution. Yet this 
is not an easy task, given the conflict’s roots in the 
country’s complex colonial and post-independence 
histories, with the so-called ‘Anglophone problem’ being 
a legacy of those histories (Konings and Nyanmjoh 
1997). Moreover, it is a much-neglected conflict, both 
internally and externally. Internally, it is relatively unheeded 
within the Francophone regions, while the government 
currently seems to have little interest in resolving it 
other than by military means. Externally, it is a conflict 
that the international community has largely overlooked. 
We have examined this conflict with reference to two 
differing and somewhat paradoxical perspectives within 
the wider scholarly literature. On the one hand, in the 
peace studies literature, the role of CSOs in conflict 
resolution is emphasised in the recent turn to bottom-
up or grassroots approaches to peacebuilding. On the 
other hand, recent literature in democratisation studies 
has noted the phenomenon of ‘shrinking civic space’ 
whereby many governments world-wide have sought to 
limit the scope and activities of CSOs thorough legislative 
and other measures. This closing of space has occurred 
partly because the significance of the role of civil society 
has blossomed globally in both democratisation and 
development processes in the 1990s and into the 2000s. 
CSOs within the Anglophone regions of Cameroon have 
found themselves very much trapped in this paradox. 
Their role is potentially crucial in seeking resolution of 
this terrible conflict, yet their operational parameters are 
increasingly constrained. Further, such difficulties are 
intensified where it is in the interest of the state to doubt 
the neutrality and objectivity of CSOs in seeking conflict 
resolution, so as to justify its repression of such actors. In 
this research, we have explored how CSOs have sought 
to contribute to the resolution of Cameroon’s Anglophone 
conflict, the challenges they have faced, especially in 
the context of a shrinking civic space, and the strategies 
adopted in turn to counter such challenges. Our findings 
concerning each of these issues are summarised in turn.
First, CSOs in the Anglophone regions have contributed 
to conflict resolution efforts in direct and indirect 
ways. Indirectly, some development organisations have 
reoriented their activities towards humanitarian efforts 
in terms of provision of food, shelter and medicines, 
notably for displaced people within the conflict zones. 
Such a response has been important both in terms of 
the immediate needs of most-affected communities 
and in gaining the trust of the overall civilian population, 
thus increasing the potential for the involvement of local 
populations in dialogue and conflict resolution efforts if and 
when they emerge. More directly, human rights-oriented 
organisations have responded by documenting violations 
by warring parties, important for holding both parties to 
account for abuses and crimes, and for raising international 
awareness of this oft-forgotten conflict. Additionally, some 
organisations, notably women’s organisations like SNWOT, 
have engaged in peace advocacy, calling for conflict 
resolution through broad dialogue which is inclusive 
of women’s voices. Women’s organisations have also 
engaged in a ‘Back2School’ campaign in opposition to the 
closure of schools by the separatist groups. It is, perhaps, 
notable that campaigning organisations such as SNWOT 
are coalitions of a number of like-minded organisations, 
aiming to enhance their collective impact and to provide 
solidarity and a degree of protection against possible 
repercussions from the state as well as from the armed 
non-state actors. While all campaigns have remained 
strictly peaceful and non-violent, it is understandable that 
CSOs have generally stayed clear of advocating political 
solutions to the conflict, such as a return to the two-state 
federalism introduced in 1961, conscious of the fate of 
CACSC and its leaders in January 2017 and the state 
repression that would befall them. 
Second, numerous challenges have been encountered 
by CSOs operating in such a difficult context. State 
administrative restrictions regarding access and 
movement within the conflict zones are manipulated 
and take on a politicised dimension, used as a means 
of surveillance and attempted control by the military 
and state authorities. Such restrictions make it difficult 
for CSOs to operate in the autonomous manner that 
they require. The implicit threats in such surveillance 
occasionally become explicit with the state secret 
services directly questioning CSO staff, accusing them of 
working with the separatist fighters. Paradoxically, CSO 
staff are also under threat from the armed separatists, 
sometimes subjected to kidnapping and accused of 
working with the military. Unsurprisingly, there can be 




by CSOs in order to ensure that state repression or 
reprisals from the separatists are not provoked. Other 
challenges include the financial constraints often faced 
by NGOs, and the conditions that are often imposed by 
international funders. However, this common challenge 
for NGOs in developing country contexts is exacerbated 
by the legislation limiting sources of funding that is part 
of the shrinking space agenda. CSO representatives also 
identified a constraint within the sector, dubbed the ‘pull 
him down syndrome’. Partly related to competition for 
scarce funds, this rivalry between NGOs is particularly 
unfortunate in such a challenging context where solidarity 
and collaboration between CSOs is so urgently needed. 
Third, despite the challenges, CSOs have adopted 
several strategies to enable them to contribute to 
conflict resolution efforts. They have embarked on 
activities aimed at raising awareness of their role. This is 
important because measures to restrict civic space by 
the government and the targeting of CSOs by parties in 
this conflict, including deliberate efforts to discredit them, 
were perceived as occurring partly because of the limited 
understanding of their role. CSOs have also made efforts 
to raise awareness of the conflict in other regions of 
Cameroon where it is little understood. Another important 
strategy has been the documentation of crimes committed 
by the warring parties. By ensuring that data documented 
on the conflict is accurate, relating it to international 
human rights law and sharing it with international human 
rights organisations, pressure has been brought to bear 
on both parties in the conflict. Such documentation 
is considered important in ensuring that parties in the 
conflict fully comprehend the consequences of their 
actions and therefore appreciate the need to engage 
in serious negotiations towards a peaceful settlement. 
Another strategy adopted was that of mobilisation. 
CSOs worked to rally peers and other members of the 
community to support a peaceful resolution of the conflict. 
Networking with international civil society organisations 
and building coalitions of local CSOs also enabled 
CSOs to counter shrinking civic space and enhance their 
visibility as conflict resolution actors. Working through 
coalitions has given them more power to influence 
conflict parties to listen to their views. Shrinking space 
has also been countered by CSOs ‘creating space’ in 
which to develop critical awareness through training and 
sensitisation campaigns on peacebuilding and rights 
issues, notably with young people to ‘drop arms’ and 
with women and girls on gender-based violence and 
sexual rights in conflict settings. Finally, dialogue and 
communication at various levels have also enabled CSOs 
to create spaces aimed at ending violence and resolving 
conflict. Importantly, dialogue with local communities 
has also enabled CSOs to bring the views of those most 
affected by the conflict into policy spaces. 
We conclude with final thoughts about how this research 
contributes to discussions on peacebuilding from below 
and on shrinking civic space. The research confirms 
the significance of a bottom-up or grassroots approach 
to peacebuilding. This entails a peacebuilding process 
where the views and interests of affected civilian 
populations are not only visibly represented in peace 
negotiations, but also captured in any settlement, with 
their needs given utmost priority in the implementation 
of any peace agreement. This is especially important in a 
context like Cameroon, where the state authorities seem 
content to rely on a military solution to the conflict through 
the defeat of the armed separatists, with disregard for 
the English-speaking civilian populations who have been 
brutalised in the conflict. The importance of a grassroots 
approach is further emphasised where international 
authorities have been unsuccessful in getting the 
government to undertake dialogue and peace negotiations 
in any meaningful way, and thus reliance on elite actors 
for conflict resolution is not practicable or realistic. The 
role of CSOs, and especially NGOs, becomes particularly 
significant in such a context, and indeed our findings 
are that the CSOs examined here have made important 
contributions towards the resolution of the Anglophone 
conflict. Their role has been at least three-fold: to engage 
with most-affected communities and build an evidence 
base of the conflict’s adverse consequences for citizens; 
to draw national and international attention to the conflict 
and its impact; and to maintain pressure for peace 
negotiations through interactions with both government 
and non-state armed actors. These different aspects of 
the role of CSOs all highlight the significance of local 
agency, a crucial element of peacebuilding from below. 
As part of such agency, it is vital that the experiences and 
perspectives of local Anglophone citizens are considered 
within all relevant fora and policy spaces, including their 
views on possible long-term solutions to the conflict. 
CSOs have a key contribution to make here as facilitators 
and mediators between local communities and regional 
and national level peace negotiation processes.
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However, the research also confirms the complexities and 
difficulties of a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding in 
the context of shrinking civic space. As elsewhere, this is 
a very real phenomenon in Cameroon, one which entails 
the exercise of both visible and hidden power by the state 
in order to restrict the activities and influence of local 
CSOs. Conflict resolution relies on agreement by warring 
parties to the cessation of violence and to a subsequent 
peace deal. Yet, for CSOs, engagement with the state 
and non-state armed actors is no easy task, especially in 
a context where both warring parties are often unwilling 
to accept the participation of CSOs or their contribution 
as key stakeholders in peace efforts. A risk is also posed 
to the very integrity of the CSOs by their being labelled 
either as ‘terrorist sympathisers’ by the state or as ‘state 
collaborators’ by armed separatists. It is also very difficult 
for CSOs to raise the root causes of the ‘Anglophone 
problem’ in terms of the alienation and marginalisation felt 
by many in the English-speaking regions in the face of the 
assimilationist policies of the Francophone-dominated 
government. These are very significant challenges to 
CSOs if a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding is 
to have any substance or impact. Yet, for the CSOs 
studied here, the ongoing horrors of violence and war 
mean that ‘doing nothing’ is not an option. The various 
strategies aimed at overcoming such challenges have 
been noted. CSOs have defended their rights to freedoms 
of association and expression in terms of existing laws 
and legislative frameworks in order to counter shrinking 
space. They have also created new spaces, both in private 
and public spheres, in which to raise critical awareness 
and to advocate for peace. Their role in the search for 
sustainable peace can be considered important, if not 
indispensable, not least due to the long-standing cultural 
predisposition for inclusive dialogue in the English-
speaking community of Cameroon. Yet the context is 
difficult, and the challenges are profound. Local CSOs 
have had to tread carefully and skilfully as mediators in 
bottom-up processes that enhance local agency in efforts 
towards conflict resolution.
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